

# Fuzz Testing in Behavior-Based Robotics

Rodrigo Delgado<sup>1</sup>, Miguel Campusano<sup>2</sup>, Alexandre Bergel<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>ISCLab, Department of Computer Science (DCC), University of Chile

<sup>2</sup>SDU UAS, MIMI, University of Southern Denmark

**Abstract**—The behavior of a robot is typically expressed as a set of source code files written using a programming language. As for any software engineering activity, programming robotic behaviors is a complex and error-prone task. This paper propose a methodology that aims to reduce the cost of producing a reliable software describing a robotic behavior by automatically testing it.

We employ a fuzz testing technique to stress software components with randomly generated data. By applying fuzz testing to a complex robotic-software, we identified errors related to the coding, the way data is handled, the logic of the robotic behavior, and the initialization of architectural components. Furthermore, a panel of experts acquainted with the analyzed behavior have highlighted the relevance and the significance of our findings. Our fuzzer operates on the SMACH and ROS frameworks and it is available under the MIT public open source license.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The behavior of a robot is usually modeled and expressed in software. A software for a robot, as any software artifact, is prone to errors and bugs. The software engineering community has produced many techniques to test and discover potential problems in an early software development phase. One popular technique is *fuzz testing*, which consists in loading a program with random data with the hope of identifying a software failure [1]. Fuzzing complements classical testing techniques by allowing one to discover bugs and errors that would be hard to find using ad-hoc generated input, as frequently happens in a laboratory setting. As far as we are aware, fuzzing for software testing has been superficially considered by the robotic community despite its property to identify software bugs and security issues.

This work describes and empirically evaluates a fuzz testing technique designed to identify bugs in a robotic behavior. Our experiment resulted in identifying critical bugs in a robot competing at the RoboCup. The severity of the bugs and the usefulness of our approach is empirically validated by a panel of experts.

**Contributions.** This paper proposes a methodology to test a state machine-based software describing the behavior of a robot, testing each state in isolation. Our fuzzer operates with the SMACH framework and is available to the community to replicate our results and apply our technique in this location [https://github.com/rdelgadov/fuzz\\_testing](https://github.com/rdelgadov/fuzz_testing). Note that our fuzzer is distributed under the MIT License, making it business-friendly and available for academic purposes.

**Hypothesis and research questions.** The hypothesis this paper is based upon is that *fuzzing can automatically identify non-trivial bugs in robotic software behaviors*. We refer to

“non-trivial bugs” as bugs that occur in situations that are not contemplated by a laboratory and controlled setting. To verify this hypothesis, we formulate the following research questions:

**RQ1:** *What are the characteristics of the errors identified by fuzz testing?* This question seeks to identify what type of errors and categories of bugs fuzzing in a software-based robotic behavior can be identified.

**RQ2:** *Can fuzz testing detect representative and realistic problems in robotic behaviors?* This question relates to the potential of fuzzing to identify bugs in the field vs in a laboratory setting.

**RQ3:** *Can fuzz testing find hard-to-spot errors?* This question relates to the complexity of identifying bugs and errors. We rely on the perception of experts to qualify on the complexity of the identification.

## II. RELATED WORK

The interdisciplinary nature of our paper’s approach shares various complimentary topics with a number of related works, such as mixing robotic behavior, software development and fuzz testing.

**Fuzz testing.** Fuzz testing is a technique originally designed to detect vulnerabilities in software systems. The techniques associated with fuzz testing are numerous. For example, the fuzzing can be guided by a grammar [2], [3], [4] or mutation [5], [6] to generate complex structured data.

Fuzz testing mixes random with automated data generation to produce a wide range of plausible values to test the software source code with. It has been shown that different fuzz techniques can find different types of bugs in the same software system [7]. There are some fuzzers that use finite state machines to model the software and apply fuzz tests to the model [8], [9]. This suggests that fuzz testing can be beneficial to a particular context, such as using state machines to define robotic behavior.

**Testing robot behavior.** Robot unit testing [10] is a close approximation to the classical unit testing in software engineering applied to robotics. Robot unit testing considers simulators as a valid and sufficiently accurate tools to test a robot software. Unit testing automatizes the monitoring of some well defined scenarios. Our approach is therefore complementary to robot unit testing since fuzz testing explores a space of possible scenarios instead of restricting the testing phase to a set of fixed and well determined scenarios.

Laval et al. propose a multi-layered testing methodology [11], in which the safety of the human operators plays

a central role. The methodology they propose relies on the definition of repeatable, reusable, and semi-automated tests. A robot is then tested on a wide range of different aspects, ranging from hardware actuators to software and the robot behavior. Similarly to robot unit testing, Laval et al. heavily rely on well defined scenarios the robot has to execute. Our approach takes a different, yet complementary stance by not being tied to any fixed and inevitably biased scenarios.

**Fuzzing and robotic.** Our effort is not the first attempt at using fuzz testing for robotic development. The `rosl_fuzzer`<sup>1</sup> operates on ROS topics to simulate the data of sensors. Our fuzzer operates on userdata, and as such, can test an individual state. Furthermore, our fuzzer uses a grammar, which significantly increases the capability of entering into conditional branches, and therefore identifying more vulnerabilities. Also, RvFuzzer [12] uses a model-based fuzzer to find valid inputs that generate errors in command-driven robots. However, RvFuzzer works at the outermost layer of the software by testing commands that execute a complete behavior and does not perform tests between components of the behavior.

### III. STATE MACHINES AND SMACH

SMACH is a task-level programming architecture to develop robotic behaviors<sup>2</sup> [13]. SMACH is written in Python and is designed to operate with ROS [14]. SMACH implements hierarchical state machines in which a state can be a state machine.

**State.** The central component in SMACH is the state definition. A state is modeled as an object with 3 parameters: outcomes, input keys, and output keys. The outcomes are string characters that represent a possible outcome transition from the state used to make connection between states. The input and output keys are the keys available to read and write data passed through the states. The input and output keys are passed through an object called *userdata*.

A state execution is expressed by evaluating its associated `execute` function, which must return a string character representing the outcome of the state. This outcome must be linked to another state when the state machine is built, this represents a transition. Returning a non-defined outcome leads to an error.

**State machine.** Each state represents an atomic behavior. A group of states can be contained in a structure called *state machine*. As such, a combination of states represents a composed and therefore complex behavior. In SMACH, state machines are hierarchical, which means that a state machine may include other state machines in addition to individual states.

**Userdata.** To pass data through a state transition, SMACH uses the notion of *userdata*, which is essentially a thread-safe dictionary, mapping keys to values. *userdata* instances are passed through the states when a transition is triggered.

**Internal and external inputs.** We call *internal inputs* to data passed through the state as *userdata*. We call *external*

*inputs* data obtained externally from the source code, e.g., sensors. As an example, a state that searches for a person in a room first identifies the person and then delivers the position information to the following states. The position given to the following states is an internal input. The image to calculate where the person is and the actual position of a robot are external inputs.

### IV. FUZZ TESTING IN ROBOTICS

Fuzz testing is a software engineering technique designed to test a software application using automatic data generation provided as inputs. This section illustrates fuzz testing for a robotic behavior and details some properties of it.

#### A. Illustrating example

Consider the following simplified example inspired by our experiment. Assume the following `execute` function of a SMACH state that simply checks for a provided confirmation:

```
def execute(userdata):
    text = userdata.confirmation_text
    if 'yes' in text:
        return "yes"
    elif 'no' in text:
        return "no"
    return "aborted"
```

The function takes as argument an *userdata* object, provided by another calling state (e.g., a voice-to-text state). The object *userdata* contains a variable `confirmation_text`, which contains a string character representing the confirmation text. The state, and therefore the `execute` function, has three possible outcomes: "yes", "no" or "aborted".

**Presence of an error.** The `execute` function given above has an error. The equality of string characters must be performed using `==` and not with the operator `in`. We have the expression `'yes' in 'yes'` that evaluates to `True`, which therefore complies with the intention of the `execute` function. However, the expression `'yes' in 'eyes'` also evaluates to `True` since the word `'eyes'` contains all the letters of `'yes'`. As such, saying "eyes" would be interpreted as a positive confirmation message, which is obviously wrong and constitutes an error.

**Fuzz testing to the rescue.** The error, which consists in using `==` instead of `in` can be easily identified with a simple value generation. Consider the function:

```
def fuzz(init=2,fin=3):
    size=random.randrange(init,fin)
    alphabet = 'yesno'
    return ''.join(random.choice(alphabet) for i in range(size))
```

The function `fuzz` generates a word of 2 or 3 letters long picked from the basket `'yesno'`. Providing such generated words as input of the state and monitoring the outcome of the state can easily uncover the code error. For example, the word `'noe'` or `'eno'` would be interpreted as a `'no'`. This example illustrates the principle of fuzz testing, which is elaborated in the next subsection.

<sup>1</sup>[https://github.com/aliasrobotics/rosl\\_fuzzer](https://github.com/aliasrobotics/rosl_fuzzer)

<sup>2</sup><http://wiki.ros.org/smach>

## B. Our Fuzzer

We built a fuzzer that operates on SMACH state machines. Our fuzzer is based on a grammar [2] and generates random values as input keys of state machines. Thanks to the hierarchical nested state machines, our fuzzer is able to operate at the level of an individual state (fine-grained and white-box testing) or a whole state machine (coarse-grained and black-box testing). Relying on a grammar to generate random input is essential to ensure a coherent structure in the provided inputs.

**White-box testing.** Our fuzzer randomly generates userdata and provides it to a particular state, possibly part of a larger state machine. In this operation mode, the fuzzer is stressing the behavior of one single state, thus we qualify this mode as white box testing by searching for issues in the internal logic (as opposed to the machine interface as we will see later).

To be able to generate appropriate userdata, it is crucial to restrict the space of the values accepted by a state. For example, assume a state expects an integer value as input. If our fuzzer provides a string character to that state, a type error will be inevitably produced. Since Python is a dynamically-typed language (as JavaScript and contrary to Java and C++), it is not possible to determine whether a variable accepts a string or a number by solely looking at the source code definition<sup>3</sup>. However, our fuzzer needs this crucial piece of information to generate random values of the appropriate type. Without such information, our fuzzer will identify trivial and non-relevant type errors instead of valuable bugs and errors in the robotic behavior logic.

To address this obstacle, we have designed a state-monitoring technique to determine the type of values expected by a state. The technique consists in monitoring values provided by a calling state to the called state. When values are provided to a state during a *seed* execution, the userdata structure is simply logged for offline analysis. We qualify as a seed the executions exercised on a robot that involves the state in which one wishes to obtain type information of the userdata. Such a seed execution is meant to represent a representative execution, which typically happens within a laboratory setting.

After one or more seed executions, types are inferred from the logs. Luckily, values commonly used in SMACH to pass through userdata are most of the times numbers or string characters. Complex data structure such as object instances are rarely employed, which greatly simplifies both the type inference and the value generation.

White-box testing is able to identify bugs and faults that are contained within one single state. As such, it is convenient to use white-box testing in critical and hub states in a possible large web of inter-connected states.

**Black-box testing.** Typically, a robot interacts with an environment in which noise in sensor reading and unexpected perturbations are unfortunately way too frequent. In the black-box testing mode, our fuzzer stresses the behavior of a whole

state machine, instead of focusing on internal and individual states. As such, black-box testing operates at a coarse grain (by considering a whole state machine) while white-box testing operates at a fine grain (by considering individual states).

Concretely, black-box testing generates values representing external values that are provided by the robot. Random values are generated and provided to a SMACH state machine, simulating a tunneling of external values. Black-box testing is adapted to simulate changes on robot data with values that may be interpreted as inadequate or wrong.

## V. EXPERIMENTS

Our hypothesis is that fuzz testing can identify erroneous and complex robotic behaviors. To verify this, three questions are stated in Section I, covering the nature of the identified problems (RQ1), the difficulty of finding these issues (RQ2), and the severity of the bug of robot behavior (RQ3). This section describes the experimental design and the methodology we used to answer the research questions and verify our hypothesis.

### A. Experimental context

The UChile Peppers team, from the University of Chile, uses a Pepper-based robot from SoftBank Robotics to support human-robot interaction in domestic environments<sup>4</sup>.

As for most robots developed in a University, large parts of the software source code is written by under- and post-graduate students during the development of their thesis. As such, it is crucial to rigorously and extensively test the robotic behavior to remain competitive. Note that the authors of this paper are not involved in the development of the robot nor part of the UChile Peppers team.

We wish to maximize the feedback from the participants in our experiment. We restrict our evaluation to white-box testing only to have a better description of the encountered errors.

### B. Methodology

We have designed a methodology to answer our three research questions, as presented in Figure 1. This subsection details each step of it.




Fig. 1: Steps of methodology to test a behavior

**S1: behavior selection.** A robot, such as the one implemented by the UChile Peppers team is complex and offers a wide range of different specific behaviors. The first step of our methodology involves the identification of the set of specific behaviors to be tested. It is important to identify such specific

<sup>3</sup>We do not consider the optional type information supported by Python as a reliable source of information due to its scarce use in robotic engineering.

<sup>4</sup><https://uchile-robotics.github.io/bender-index.html>

behaviors and clearly determine the expected outputs. As such, it is important that the specific behaviors are deterministic and may be re-executed at will.

**S2: input description.** Accepted input values must be adequately described and characterized in order to apply fuzz testing to a state or a state machine. This involves identifying (i) the names of the inputs, (ii) the type of the data used by the state code (using the state-monitoring technique), and (iii) whether it is external or internal to adequately tune the value generation by our fuzzer. The output of that step is a clear and unambiguous description of the input. The fuzzer is also correctly tuned to produce inputs properly structured by designing a grammar.

In case the fuzzer produces some values of a wrong type or inadequately defined (e.g., providing positive numbers while only negative numbers are expected), additional seed executions may be run or the grammar may be refined.

**S3: run the fuzzer.** The third step consists in executing the fuzzer on each state of the state machine involved in the selected robot behavior to be tested. To execute a state, input values must be generated using the grammar and the type information described above.

The more a state is tested (i.e., executed with generated input values), the probability to identify faults and anomalies increases. A state execution represents an incremental unit of exploring the space of plausible input values, thus increasing the likelihood to trigger an anomaly.

The number of executions of each state is specified by one of the hyperparameters associated to the fuzzing process. In our actual setting, we execute each state 100 times. As we will discuss later on, this arbitrary value produced satisfactory results, but this number can be increased in presence of solid computational resources (e.g., a cluster of CPU or multiple and identical instances of the robot).

The output of this step S3 is a set of logs of each state execution that contains (i) the input values, (ii) state outcomes, (iii) errors if any, (iv) state execution time, and (v) stack trace if an error occurred.

**S4: result analysis.** After executing the states, logs are carefully and semi-automatically reviewed to identify anomalies in the behavior execution. From our experience, anomalies are best identified by using two different approaches: (i) looking for errors and stack traces, and (ii) comparing the fuzzer outputs with executions that are known to be correct (as obtained in a laboratory and controlled setting).

**S5: error selection.** Many possible software anomalies may have been identified from the previous step. As such, the practitioner needs to filter false positives from relevant software errors. Furthermore, duplication of errors must be filtered out: different input values may lead to the same error. The associated stack traces are likely to be sufficient at identifying whether the error is the same or not.

**S6: classification.** When a situation is encountered, be it an error or an expected behavior, it is crucial to determine the cause of, as it is most likely caused by either incorrect inputs or an error in the state behavior.

**S7: specific value.** If an error is caused by incorrect inputs, the grammar used by the fuzzer has to be refined, thus making the process jump to Step S2. Consider the case where a state expects a string as input value, but only two different strings are accepted, 'yes' and 'no' as in our previous example. Providing any other strings may lead to an abnormal behavior. In this particular case, the grammar needs to restrict the string generation under these constraints.

As software defining a robotic behavior grows over time, it frequently happens that a developer has little knowledge about what she needs to operate with. This step allows you to test a state without knowing its inner workings. A practitioner can iterate by refining the grammar until relevant software anomalies are spotted. Note that in case of providing different types of input values that allow a seemingly successful execution, the behavior of the state may have a vulnerability or simply not use the provided input.

**S8: report.** At this stage, we, as external agents of the development team, are confident that the filtered errors designate situations that must be reported to the robotic development team.

For each identified error, we asked the following questions to a panel of experts:

- *Q1 – Do you think this situation is a software problem?*
- *Q2 – Do you have a connection with the situation?*
- *Q3 – Do you think you could have found the situation on your own?*
- *Q4 – Have you seen this situation before?*
- *Q5 – How difficult do you think it is to find the situation?* Answers ranges from 1 (easy) to 5 (hard)
- *Q6 – Is it important for RoboCup competition?* Answers range from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important)

This questionnaire collects opinions about our findings in an unbiased fashion. Each panel member was individually questioned and not in a group to not influence other members. Our questionnaire does not mention the word “error” to not bias the participant in taking our findings as an actual error. Instead, we use the generic term “situation”, which is more neutral on the kind of problems reflected by our findings.

Each participant received and evaluated three situations per errors. We indicated to the participants the exact location of an error in the source code, the input values our fuzzer generated, and the outcomes from the state execution. We also encourage the participant to reproduce the error.

We voluntarily kept a low number of evaluations to avoid fatigue from our participants, which would inevitably affect the quality of their opinion. The following section presents our results.

## VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We applied our methodology on a robotic behavior provided by the UChile Peppers team. The robotic software we tested is composed of 124 different states, defining 6 different specific robotic behaviors. In total, our fuzzer operated on 24 different internal inputs using a dedicated grammar and 9 external inputs with different options.

Part. ID	Exp. [years]	Position	Area	Errors
P1	4	Und.	CS	E3, E4, E5
P2	1	Und.	EE	E1, E2, E6
P3	5	Und.	ME	E2, E3, E5
P4	3	Und.	EE	E1, E2, E4
P5	4	Und.	EE	E2, E3, E6
P6	5	PhD/Prof.	CS	E1, E3, E4
P7	6	Prof.	EE / CS	E2, E5, E6

TABLE I: Participant information (Und. = undergraduate student, Prof. = professional, CS = Computer Science, EE = Electrical Engineering, ME = Mechanical Engineering)

In total, we identified 6 software errors that we believe are anomalies in the robotic behavior. We presented these 6 errors to the 7 members of the UChile Peppers team.

Each error was reviewed by at least 3 different participants to give us a chance to contrast different perceptions of the same error. Table I summarizes the distribution of the different errors to each participant. To ease the post mortem analysis of the interviews, each session was recorded.

#### A. Error characterization

We formulated our first research question as follows:

**RQ1:** *What are the characteristics of the errors identified by fuzz testing?*

The 6 errors we identified either (i) prevented the state to complete its execution or (ii) emitted errors and warning using the SMACH or ROS logging facility. We classify these 6 errors into four categories: *syntax error*, *data handling error*, *logic error*, and *architecture configuration error*. We adopted the three first categories from Zhao *et al.* [15] to classify bug fixes.

**Syntax error.** We designate as a syntax error a sequence of characters that cannot be interpreted by the Python interpreter. Syntax errors happen to be frequently produced by non-experts since (i) programming environments for Python do a poor job at notifying practitioners about the presence of such errors, (ii) robot programmers usually do not have training in software engineering. A syntax error will occur when the interpreter is trying to execute the first instruction contained in the file with an error. Consider the following code snippet:

```
action_mapping = {"left": "I am going left" "right": "I am going right"}
```

This code contains a syntax error because a comma is missing between the string "I am going left" and "right". Our fuzzer identified one syntax error, which was not detected during the development and the test made in laboratory because it was fixed on the robot itself.

**Data handling error.** By being dynamically typed, Python does not offer a safety net to prevent elementary incorrect data. Furthermore, it frequently happens that collections of heterogeneous elements are provided, e.g., if the tuple ('move\_left', 15) is provided to a state, then that state needs to assume that the first element of that tuple is a string and the second is an integer. If not done, the code will likely suffer from a data handling error.

Data handling error occurs when data are not properly handled by a state. In such a case, the error could either be in the calling state (i.e., data passed to another state is incorrectly defined), or in the called state (i.e., data provided as input is correct but incorrectly handled). Consider the following code snippet:

```
a_list = userdata.list_objects
position = (a_list[0], a_list[1])
return position
```

In a previous version of the code, the variable `userdata.list_objects` was containing the two coordinates of a position in a two-dimensional space. After a new version of the code was produced, the variable now provides a label indicating a physical position (e.g., 'Door') instead of coordinates. It will return a tuple of chars (e.g., ("D", "o")) and will produce an error on the following states.

We also qualify as a data handling error situations where a declared parameter is not accessible (e.g., by using the remapping ability of SMACH), or if some non-existent data are being accessed (e.g., `a_list = userdata.non_existing_field`). We found 3 errors where data was not well defined or the state tries to access non-existing data.

Data handling errors may be complex to find and debug because they usually require a solid knowledge about the state producing the data, the data itself, and the state consuming the data. Furthermore, the producer and the consumer of data can be distant. This may happen in the case that a state simply forwards the received data. In such a case, our fuzzer is therefore valuable at identifying such an error.

**Logic error.** An incorrect conditional statement or loop control may lead to a logic error. During the execution, a logic error may be expressed by executing a wrong branch in a condition (e.g., the `else` branch is executed instead of the `then` branch). Consider the following code:

```
# text_confirmation='Yes'
if userdata.text_confirmation=='yes':
    return 'yes'
elif userdata.text_confirmation=='no':
    return 'no'
return 'aborted'
```

This code contains a logic error because the variable `text_confirmation` points to the capitalized string 'Yes', while the first condition is expressed with lowercase 'yes'. As a result, the branch `return 'aborted'` will be considered while obviously the first one should be considered.

From our experience with the software provided by the UChile Peppers team, logic errors are usually difficult to catch and identify. One reason for this difficulty is the fact that a logical error is usually not expressed by an application crash. Instead, in our experiment, a logical error is expressed by an unexpected behavior of the robot. In the example given above, orally saying "yes" to the robot was transcribed as 'Yes' instead of 'yes' by the voice-to-text module. Thus

Error	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6
E1	3/3	0/3	2/3	3/3	2.7	5
E2	5/5	2/5	5/5	3/5	3	4.8
E3	3/4	3/4	3/4	3/4	2.75	4.5
E4	2/3	1/3	3/3	3/3	1.7	4
E5	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3	2.3	4.7
E6	3/3	1/3	1/3	2/3	2.3	4.5

TABLE II: Result of our experiment. Questions are listed in Section V-B. In X/Y, X = number of “yes” and Y = total number of answers. Average score is given for Q5 and Q6.

leading to an unexpected behavior. Identifying logical errors involves a close comparison of the fuzzer output with a correct execution performed in a controlled setting. During our experiment, we found one case of a logical error.

**Architecture configuration error.** To perform a sophisticated behavior, a robot will typically involve various independently designed components. When initiating or resetting a robot behavior, a long sequence of component initializations must be performed. We experienced an unexpected behavior in the way the main state machine of the robot is initialized. By providing a particular list of robot features to activate, an extraordinary large amount of logs were produced by both SMACH and ROS. After the initialization, the robot did not seem to have any anomalies. After discussing with a core developer of the UChile Peppers team, it seems that some components associated to a particular robot features are initialized more than once in some non-obvious circumstance. As a result, significantly more logs were generated, however, no apparent dysfunctions were experienced. We experienced only one instance of this architecture configuration error.

**Answering RQ1.** In our experiment, we found four kinds of errors: syntax errors, data handling error, logical errors, and architecture configuration error. It is likely that other kinds of errors may be found, for example involving an incorrect use of an API, or an incorrect interaction with a sensor driver. However, in our experimental setting, we have not seen such a case.

### B. Realistic error

We aim to identify realistic errors and anomalies in software modeling robotic behaviors. We surveyed a panel of experts to assess the practical values of the software errors we identified. Collecting opinions and feedback about our findings is essential to assess how close our technique meets practitioners expectation. We formulated our second research questions as:

**RQ2:** *Can fuzz testing detect representative and realistic problems in robotic behaviors?*

Answers of the questions defined in Section V-B are listed in Table II. The situations we presented to the participants are largely identified as a software problem (Q1). The errors we identified were known to the participants, but they were not fixed (Q4). The reported errors are perceived as important or very important (Q6).

Being able to build repeatable unit test cases using the values provided by our fuzzer is perceived as very valuable by the participants. For example, E2 is a data handling error

that occurred when an undeclared variable was used in an if-else clause. Participant P3 knew of the error E2 since she already encountered it during RoboCup 2018. The error was fixed for the competition, but the fix was never incorporated in the software. As such, we found the error that already appeared before the competition.

**Answering RQ2.** We therefore answer to RQ2 by stating that our fuzz technique was able to identify representative and realistic problems for the robotic behavior defined by the UChile Peppers team.

### C. Hard-to-spot errors

Intuitively, an error that is easy to spot is likely easy to fix. Oppositely, an error that is well hidden in the internal software is likely to be damaging in the long run since people may build on top of it. Assessing the difficulty for practitioners to identify the errors is therefore important. We formulated our third research question as follows:

**RQ3:** *Can fuzz testing find hard-to-spot errors?*

We found that although participants do not have a connection to the presented errors (Q2), however, they think they could have found the errors (Q3) without too much effort (Q5). Interestingly, these errors were not investigated or even reported before our experiment.

We found out that the expertise of a practitioner directly contributes to the ability of identifying errors. A practitioner with high expertise in Python and the employed frameworks will likely perceive syntax errors as easy to find, and our experiment confirmed it. An experienced practitioner may also be familiar with debugging and memory inspecting tools, which is apparently key to identifying and addressing data handling errors. However, the logic errors seem to be the most complicated kinds of errors to identify and address. Although we do not pretend to generalize our case, some of the participants indicated that the logic error we identified was hard to spot.

**Answering RQ3.** Overall, we answer to RQ3 by stating that our fuzzer identified errors that are perceived as mildly difficult to be found, therefore not considered as hard-to-spot despite being latent for possibly a long time and not being reported by the team.

## VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Our overall effort indicates that software artifacts developed by the robotic community could benefit from state-of-the-art techniques produced by the software engineering community.

We have produced a fuzzer, available to the SMACH and ROS community. Our experiment indicates clear benefits for the robotic behavior we have analyzed. Currently, one significant threat to the validity of our work is that we only have conclusive results for one single robot. As future work, we plan to replicate our results with different robots and robotic behaviors.

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